

Pakistan Wrecked Havoc in Junagadh, Akin To That of Jammu and Kashmir

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ABSTRACT:

The State of J&K was scourged by an all out invasion from Pakistan in August of 1947, just days after it signed the Standstill Agreement with it. But it falls to reason that Jinnah Saheb, the crafty politician, did not stay complacent towards any of the other 554 Princely States either, as one by one they acceded to India. The fact that an overwhelming majority of the Princely States' rulers, both Hindu and Muslim, chose to join the Indian Dominion was not due to any lack of effort on his part. Quite naturally, after all those people who wished to do so, shifted residence between India and Pakistan; there were more Muslims remaining in India than in Pakistan. The ever persistent Jinnah put in herculean tactics to obtain as many Hindu and Muslim States for Pakistan as he could. Jinnah tried desperately, to influence the rulers of States like Hyderabad, Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Amarkot, Junagadh, Mangrol, Manavadar and many many more such States to accede to Pakistan. All these States had an overwhelming Hindu majority population. It's ironic that if the rulers had succumbed to the Charlatanry of Jinnah, Pakistan would indeed be an Islamic Republic; founded on Islamic theosophy, but with the amassed area occupied predominantly by Hindus. They would obviously not remain such for long, had that eventuality occurred. They would have either been converted to the PAK faith or been annihilated. Let us consider in this Research Paper, what happened with Junagadh.

Jinnah dazzled the Nawab of Junagadh with false promises and empty hopes, but delivered nothing but misery until Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto (father of the more recognised Zulfikar Ali Bhutto), under the advice of the Junagadh State Council and the 'Jamiat of Junagadh', requested the Indian Government to redeem the State by taking over the administration. Here we shall investigate this 'Junagadh' issue. The whole world, except for Pakistan, recognises Junagadh to be an integral part of India. Perhaps, Pakistan occupies an alternative reality, to which no other nation of the world prescribes.

INTRODUCTION

Kathiawar comprised an area of 22,000 square miles with a population of nearly 40 lakh people, out of which, 7 lakh were muslim . Junagadh, with an areas of 3,337 square miles, and an over 80% Hindu population of 6,70,719 , was a State on the coast of Saurashtra, surrounded by Indian territory. Therefore it had no geographical contiguity with Pakistan . Bounded on three sides by States which had acceded to India, and on the fourth by the Arabian Sea, it was the largest salute State in Kathiawar . It, however, did not boast of the largest revenue. That honour belonged to Bhavnagar State of Kathiawar. Of course, it must be taken into account that the Nawab of Junagadh spent upto Rs.40 lakh annually for his personal and family expenses, which significantly depleted the treasury.

Many States in Kathiawar had portions situated in other States of Kathiawar itself, which were considered islands of territory outside their individual boundaries. Junagadh had enclaves in the bordering states of Gondal, Baroda , Nawanager and Bhavnagar, all of which had acceded to India. Other states in Kathiawar, which had also acceded to India, had enclaves in Junagadh . Nawanager, Gondal and Junagadh had nine, eighteen and twenty-four separate areas of territory, respectively. 46 States of Kathiawar claimed an area of two square miles or less . Even these were not indivisible units and therefore were governed by multiple

sovereigns; who claimed as shareholders. Therefore Kathiawar as a whole was divided into 860 jurisdictions . For example, a small principality known as ‘Dahida’, with an area of 2 square miles had six shareholders . Each individual sovereign claimed independence to accede (join) either Dominion of India or Pakistan on the lapse of Paramountcy i.e. on the British withdrawing from India in 1947 . In all equity and justice the individual rulers had become independent as soon as the June 3rd Plan implementing Lapse of Paramountcy was announced. All these factors led to one conclusion: the Kathiawar States had to accede, as a whole, to one or the other of the two new Dominions: they were too mixed up territorially to do otherwise . The Inauguration of the United State of Kathiawar was performed by the ‘Shining Light of India’ - Sardar Patel at Jamnagar, on 15th February, 1948. The events leading up to this faithful day are discussed below.

VERY BRIEF HISTORY OF JUNAGADH.

It was a Rajput State. In 1472-73 it was invaded by Sultan Muhammad Bedga of Ahmedabad. During Emperor Akbar’s reign it became a dependency of the Court of Delhi and under immediate authority of the Subah of Ahmedabad. In 1735, there was a soldier serving as officer under the Subah of Ahmedabad, named Sherkhan Babi. He threw out the Moghul Governor and declared himself ruler of Junagadh. Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji – the last Nawab of Junagadh and a widely proclaimed eccentric, was the descendent of Sherkhan Babi.

THE DEWAN OF JUNAGADH-ABDUL KADIR MOHAMMED HUSSAIN AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ADVISOR-NABI BAKSH ADVISED THE NAWAB TO ACCEDE TO INDIA.

This Nawab was one of the few rulers in Kathiawar who did not want to unify it. He promoted autonomy and separate entity of the individual States of Kathiawar . This was neither feasible nor desirable because after the British withdrew, it was not possible for most of the individual States within Kathiawar to run a sustained administration themselves. Khan Bahadur Abdul Kadir Mohammed Hussain, the Dewan of Junagadh absolutely denied allegations that Junagadh was interested in joining Pakistan . Nabi Baksh – the Constitutional Advisor to the Nawab and brother of the Dewan, told Lord Mountbatten that his intention was to advise the Nawab that he should accede to India . He gave the same impression to Jam Saheb of Nawanagar and to Sardar Patel.

MUSLIM LEAGUE SOWS THE SEEDS OF DISCORD.

In 1947, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto decided to come to Junagadh from active politics in the ‘Muslim League’ in Karachi. He joined the State Council of Ministers, allegedly at the invitation of the Dewan . The same year, he took over the position of this Dewan . Subsequently the Dewan’s brother was stripped of his position. The ‘Muslim League’ perched itself now in the most influential seat in Junagadh. They tracked every breath and movement of the Nawab, who inevitably became their puppet. Jinnah advised the Nawab not to Accede to India under any circumstances, and to hold out till 15th August.

WHAT THE ‘BRITISH POLITICAL DEPARTMENT’ DID UNDER THE ‘ATTACHMENT SCHEME’ BECAME REDUNDANT IN VIEW OF LAPSE OF PARAMOUNTCY.

Four years before the transfer of power, the British joined some of the smaller units to the neighbouring bigger States. This ‘Attachment Scheme’, an implementation of the ‘British Political Department’ covered an area of 7,000 square miles and provoked bitter opposition from the rulers of the smaller States.

BEGINNING OF CONFUSION AND STRIFE IN KATHIAWAR BECAUSE OF JUNAGADH’S PERFIDIOUS ACTIVITIES

On Transfer of Power and British withdrawal in 1947, these rulers were no longer bound by the ‘Attachment Scheme’, which had deleterious results in many parts of Kathiawar. For example, the Sheikh of Mangrol, a very small state adjoining Junagadh, signed a Standstill Agreement and Instrument of Accession with India. Major portion of the State of Mangrol was independent of Junagadh. But according to the ‘Attachment Scheme’, in respect of 21 tiny villages, the civil and criminal jurisdiction was exercised by

Junagadh, subject to a guarantee by the British Government that this power would not be misused. The Nawab of Junagadh refused to recognise the Accession of Mangrol to India, asserting that according to the 'Attachment Scheme', Mangrol contained 21 villages which were under his jurisdiction and even though those villages formed a very tiny part of the State, it resulted in the State becoming his vassal. But soon after announcement of The June 3rd Plan, the British Political Department retroceded the jurisdiction enjoyed by the Crown Representative in the Civil Administration. The Sheikh of Mangrol therefore maintained that with paramountcy lapsing, he was independent.

Lord Mountbatten addressed this question to a leading British Constitutional lawyer who was fully conversant with the position and history of Mangrol. The lawyer studied the documents connected with the issue and concluded that as soon as Junagadh became eligible to sign the Instrument of Accession, Mangrol also became independent of Junagadh, because this whole situation has resulted from Lapse of Paramountcy of the British. In such circumstances the 'Attachment Scheme' of the 'British Political Department' also lapses. Propriety notwithstanding, the Nawab illegally dispatched his troops into Babariawad, an area comprising estates whose rulers challenged the Nawab's over lordship and had acceded to India. This was done at the behest of Pakistan. In fact seven companies of the 'Pakistan Reserve Police' were offered to Junagadh.

The Government of India requested the Nawab of Junagadh to remove his troops from Babariawad. Sir Bhutto replied his refusal to withdraw the Junagadh troops. This amounted to an act of aggressive invasion. Repeated requests from India to the Junagadh Nawab (who was aided by Pakistan) fell on deaf ears. In order to protect the areas that had acceded to India, an infantry brigade of the Indian Army was dispatched to Kathiawar. The Brigade Commander was ordered not to violate Junagadh territory and not even to enter Mangrol and Babariawad, but to deploy his troops only in the other territories that had acceded to India. On 1st October a telegram was received that Junagadh troops had entered Mangrol as well. Eventually, on November 1st, 1947 India dispatched civil administrators, each accompanied by a small token force, to take over the administration of Mangrol and Babariawad. On 9 November 1948, with the unanimous approval of the State Council and leaders of public opinion, the administration of the State of Junagadh was also peacefully handed over to India without incident.

THE QUESTION OF ACCESSION OF JUNAGADH

On 13th August, 1947 on behalf of the Nawab of Junagadh, Sir Bhutto called a Conference of leading citizens to consider the decision of Accession to either Dominion. The citizens handed him a Memorandum for submission to the Nawab, urging that Junagadh be ceded to India. Despite this clear vote against Pakistan, the Government of Junagadh announced two days later that it was deciding to join Pakistan. This decision was not communicated officially to the Government of India.

When the Nawab was asked to hold a plebiscite by the neighbouring Princes of Kathiawar, he replied that, "The Indian Independence Act, (of 1935) did not and does not require a ruler to consult his people before deciding on Accession." Jinnah insisted that 'Accession is only the ruler's prerogative and he alone has to decide which Dominion he will join'. Jinnah only denied the J&K Maharaja-Sir Hari Singh this right, because the Maharaja unequivocally acceded to India. Thus J&K rendered a massive blow to Jinnah, as he had all along sung the song that J&K is in the pocket of Pakistan, with his most oft quoted phrase- 'It will fall into our lap like a ripe fruit.' Nehru suggested that a referendum be conducted in all States. Liaquat Ali Khan argued that, 'the ruler had the absolute right to accede without reference to the moral or ethnic aspects of accession'.

UNSETTLED CONDITIONS IN JUNAGADH

The situation in Junagadh worsened by the day. More than 1 lakh Hindus had already fled the State for fear that they would be massacred by Pakistanis in the same way as the J&K people were. Reports of mass rape and mass slaughter by Pakistanis streamed in everyday from J&K. The Khan of Manavadar was arresting local leaders and harassing the people. The tranquility of the whole of Kathiawar was hanging by a thread. Mass protests and morchas had already broken out. The people were not to be silenced except by a

referendum (plebiscite). India repeatedly asked the Nawab (aided by Pakistan) to stop the brutalities and harassment of the people of Junagadh, Mangrol and Babariawad and to hold a plebiscite as a method of determining their will of accession to either Dominion. But the people being in overwhelming favour of India, Pakistan knew it would lose. On 16th October, 1947 Liaqat Ali Khan told Lord Mountbatten that he was agreeable to a plebiscite in Junagadh. On 21st October Pandit Nehru wired Liaqat Ali Khan that he wanted to send V. P. Menon to Lahore to discuss the details of conducting the plebiscite as soon as possible. Mr. Khan promptly replied that he had never agreed to plebiscite, but instead that Lord Mountbatten had misunderstood.

THE NAWAB ABANDONS JUNAGADH AND FLEES WITH CONTENTS OF STATE TREASURY.

The unsettled conditions in Junagadh had led to the depletion in its resources due to the fact that it derived most of its revenue from railways and customs, being a Port State. Now, at the behest of Pakistan, it was preventing dealings with the States surrounding it, which had acceded to India. This immensely decreased the import-export, railways and customs traffic, which could have brought it income. Traders refused to risk doing business with Junagadh. Pakistan favoured that the Nawab refuse to continue trade with India. The food position thus became precarious. Jinnah had promised him supplies on the premise that Veraval was not far from Karachi. Scarce supplies were sent as a bribe to keep the Nawab hoping. Nothing more ever came. This betrayed the fact that Jinnah had forsaken Junagadh while the people starved. India offered to help but was not allowed by the Pakistanis and the Nawab.

Towards the end of October the Nawab of Junagadh left for Karachi with all the cash, shares and securities of the State treasury, some of his wives, children, dogs, and the family jewellery. He took with him Government Promissory notes in excess of the amount of Rs.1,29,34,700, which at that time was an exorbitant sum of money. As the party was about to enter the plane, it was found that one of the begums' children had been left behind but the Nawab refused to wait; the plane took off leaving the begum behind to find her way.

Sir Bhutto complained to Jinnah about the disastrous fate that Junagadh had brought upon itself by aligning with Pakistan. He said and I quote, "...today our brethren are indifferent and cold. Muslims of Kathiawar seem to have lost all enthusiasm for Pakistan". At this juncture Sir Bhutto was managing the State in view of the fact that the Nawab had abandoned Junagadh unceremoniously. On 5th November, 1947 the Junagadh State Council held a meeting at which it was decided to have a complete re-orientation of the State Policy and readjustment of relations with the two Dominions even if it involved a reversal of the earlier decision to accede to Pakistan. Sir Bhutto voluntarily offered to hand over the State to the Government of India, since the administration was no longer tenable in this condition; the Nawab had deserted and Pakistan showed no interest in rendering any aid.

India sent a telegram to Pakistan stressing that the Indian Government was acceding to the request of the Dewan-Sir Bhutto, but that India still wished to conduct a plebiscite to ascertain the people's wishes.

The State was handed over peacefully to the Indian troops who thereafter marched into Junagadh. In the absence of any constructive proposal from Pakistan, the Government of India held a referendum on 20 February 1948, to ascertain the wishes of the people regarding accession. In Junagadh, 1,90,870 votes were cast out of an electorate of 2,01,457. Those voting for Pakistan totalled 91, and the rest voted for India. In Babariawad, Bantwa, Sardargarh, etc. including the two States with Muslim rulers i.e. Mangrol and Manavadar, out of the 31,434 votes cast, only 39 people voted for Pakistan. The 'SUNDAY TIMES' and 'DAILY TELEGRAPH' meticulously inspected the method and conduct of the referendum in order to report to the world if there was any foul play involved. They found the whole process to be fair and just. Pakistan still continues to include Junagadh within its territory in its official maps.

CONCLUSION

The truth of the matter is that Pakistan had full knowledge of what was happening in Junagadh, but decided not to bother. That State would have been a financial liability to Pakistan, even though the Nawab wanted to

accede. Karachi was 300 miles from Junagadh by sea. There was no other way for Pakistan to connect with Junagadh, because the surrounding States had acceded to India. Junagadh, if attached to Pakistan, would take more money to administer than its revenue accrued. For example, Junagadh would not be continuing commercial intercourse with the surrounding Indian territories from which it earned most of its income. In addition Junagadh received 'Zortalbi' from those Indian territories, which would not continue after the British Paramountcy lapsed. Pakistan did not want to include all Muslims in its territory. It wanted the lands of Hindus and Muslims which were beneficial from the revenue point of view. In fact it complained at the U.N.O. meeting that it was opposed to the fact that Muslim refugees were coming into Pakistan and wanted to put a stop to it. Contrary to what Jinnah would have us believe, Pakistan was formed for political gains of the Muslim League, not the good of Muslims in general. Even with regard to Jammu & Kashmir, the Pakistan Minister of Foreign Affairs went on record at the United Nations Security Council meeting and told the United Nations Commission that Pakistan was supremely interested in JammuKashmir because, "...if India had control over Jammu and Kashmir, it would be in a position to divert all five rivers of the Punjab, and thus could reduce to a desert one third of the irrigated areas of West Punjab." The Foreign Minister of Pakistan also expressly said that Pakistani troops were dispatched for one of the main reasons being, "Prevention of the influx of (muslim) refugees into Pakistan"

Before Sir Bhutto - the Dewan could ask the Indian Union to take the State under its wing, Captain Harvey Jones – a Senior Member of the Junagadh Council went to Karachi and Lahore so as to be able to meet with the Nawab and Pakistani authorities. Yet Pakistan showed no interest. On his return he negotiated with Samaldas Gandhi to hand over the administration to the Provincial Government. Sir Bhutto, acting under the Nawab of Junagadh, officially telegraphed the Governor-General and P.M. of Pakistan, telling them that the Junagadh State Council as well as the leaders of public opinion had unanimously decided to invite the Indian Government to take over the State. On the same day Sir Bhutto left for Karachi, in a last ditch effort to convince Pakistan to show any interest in Junagadh whatsoever. But all efforts were fruitless. Pakistan was a profit enterprise. It did not want to waste its time with Junagadh. India too, waited for some communication from Pakistan till the evening of 9th November, 1947. On 13th November, the much adored Sardar Patel was greeted with a rousing reception by the people of Junagadh. He addressed them at a mammoth gathering, in the grounds of the Bahauddin College. The Sardar promised the people that the Indian Government would abide by their wishes and asked them to indicate whether they wished to accede. Over ten thousand hands were immediately raised in favour of India. As soon as normalcy was restored, a referendum was held under the supervision of Shri C. B. Nagarkar, who was neither Hindu nor Muslim by religion. The referendum results, as indicated in detail in the preceding paragraphs, illustrated the resounding concurrence of the people of Junagadh and the rest of Kathiawar to stay with India even though Jinnah played every trick in the politician's handbook.

REFERENCES

1. Government records of 1947.
2. V. P. Menon.
3. According to the Census of 1941
4. See map of 1947.
5. Out of 14 Salute States which comprised Kathiawar. There were also seventeen non-salute States and 191 other smaller States in Kathiawar.
6. Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retd), Deputy Director, IPCS.
7. The main framework of Colonel Walker's Settlement remained practically undisturbed till 1947 attainment of Independence.
8. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
9. The 'TRIBUNE', July, 1939.
10. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
11. The 'TRIBUNE', July, 1939.
12. The 'Resident' Colonel Walker endorsed this view when he wrote to the Governor General.
13. Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retd), Deputy Director, IPCS.
14. According to Press-Note issued by Junagadh on 11th April, 1947

15. Allegations in the vernacular press of the time.
16. Junagadh Government Gazette, on 22nd April, 1947 reproduced this speech of the dewan.
17. On 25th July, 1947 after a meeting which was addressed by Mountbatten in which Junagadh was represented by Nabi Baksh.
18. When he met Sardar during his stay in Delhi.
19. Jam Saheb held Office of Rajpramukh for life, as per the 'First Supplementary Covenant' out of three supplementary covenants, signed by the rulers of the Union State of Kathiawar in November, 1948.
20. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
21. A Muslim League politician based in Karachi.
22. That is Abdul Kadir Mohammed Hussain.
23. Who went abroad allegedly for health reasons.
24. Thereby bringing the Nawab completely under the sway of the Muslim League.
25. As per a letter from Bhutto to Jinnah about interview of 16th July, 1947, in which Jinnah had advised the Nawab. Mentioned by V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
26. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
27. Which was void because of Lapse of British Paramountcy.
28. Meaning that Junagadh had no claim over Mongrol and the Sheikh was free to accede whether Junagadh did or not.
29. Who came to Delhi at that time.
30. Correspondence between Pakistan and Junagadh which subsequently fell into the hands of the Indian Administration when the Nawab and Sir Bhutto abandoned the State and left for Pakistan with the entire contents of the State Treasury.
31. At a meeting of Joint Defense Council of India and Pakistan held at Delhi that day, Nehru suggested to Liaquat Ali Khan that the Junagadh troops be withdrawn from Babariawad.
32. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
33. Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retd), Deputy Director, IPCS.
34. Memorandum on behalf of Hindu Citizens who comprised overwhelming majority in the State of Junagadh.
35. Via Government of Junagadh Communique of 15th August, 1947.
36. Government of India came to know of it from a news paper published report on 17th August, 1947.
37. Muslim ruler of the Hindu State of Manavadar.
38. Maharaja of Gondal said the peace and tranquillity of whole of Kathiawar was in danger.
39. In a talk between Lord Mountbatten and Liaquat Ali Khan in Lahore.
40. Liaquat Ali Khan claimed a few days saying he was indisposed, so Pt. Nehru had to wait a few days.
41. He was not agreeable to a plebiscite.
42. Mentioned in letter from Sir Bhutto to Jinnah about the interview granted to him by the latter on 16th July, 1947. This existence of this letter is mentioned by V. P. Menon in 'The Story of the Integration of the Indian States'.
43. Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retd), Deputy Director, IPCS.
44. She is said to have gone to Diu, to the Portuguese settlement.
45. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
46. See Letter from Sir Bhutto to Jinnah of 27th October, 1947.
47. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
48. The Nawab sent a telegram from Karachi to Sir Bhutto asking him to handle the matters as he best could.
49. The Dewan was authorised by the Nawab, to negotiate with the proper authorities.
50. V. P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States.
51. See report of Douglas Brown of the Daily Telegraph.
52. Report of Josselyn Hennessy of the Sunday Times.
53. Maj. Gen. Ashok Krishna (Retd), Deputy Director, IPCS.
54. This was a kind of tribute received by the Nawab from a large number of Chiefs of Kathiawar.
55. Statement of Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan at the U.N. Security Council Meeting, noted in the United Nations Commission records. (S/1100)
56. United Nations Commission records (S/1100, para 67).
57. Ibid (S/1100, para 51)
58. Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto's letter to Regional Commissioner of 8th November, 1947 records the entails of the telegraph.
59. To personally meet Pakistani authorities
60. By a show of hands immediately and followed after normalcy was restored by a plebiscite.
61. He was Senior Judicial Officer of the I.C.S.